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Abstract. Data minimisation is a privacy-enhancing principle consid-
ered as one of the pillars of personal data regulations. This principle
dictates that personal data collected should be no more than necessary
for the specific purpose consented by the user. In this paper we study
data minimisation from a programming language perspective. We as-
sume that a given program embodies the purpose of data collection, and
define a data minimiser as a pre-processor for the input which reduces
the amount of information available to the program without compromis-
ing its functionality. In this context we study formal definitions of data
minimisation, present different mechanisms and architectures to ensure
data minimisation, and provide a procedure to synthesise a correct data
minimiser for a given program.
1 Introduction
A standard interpretation of sequential programs is to interpret them as func-
tions taking data as input, performing some computation and giving a result. The
result should somehow be dependent on the input, so provided enough “good”
data is given as input the program should be able to perform computations and
give the expected result in conformance with its functional specification.
There are many reasons for not providing more input data than needed. Be-
sides time and space, other non-functional requirements can benefit from min-
imisation of the input. This is particularly relevant when processing personal,
eventually sensitive, data. According to the Article 5 of the General Data Protec-
tion Regulation proposal (GDPR) “Personal data must be [. . . ] limited to what
is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed” [11].3 Note
that this principle exists in other regulations and is sometimes referred to as “col-
lection limitation” when it focuses on the particular step of collecting data. This
is for instance the case of the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) [31]
in USA, and the Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows
3 The General Data Protection Regulation (EU —2016/679) was adopted on 27 April
2016, and it will enter into application 25 May 2018. Unlike a Directive it does not
require any enabling legislation to be passed by governments.
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1 input ( s a l a r y )
2 b e n e f i t s := ( s a l a r y < 10000)
3 output ( b e n e f i t s )
Fig. 1: Running example Pbl to compute a benefits level.
of Personal Data [25] proposed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD).
If we consider data minimisation from the regulatory point of view, the in-
put data not semantically used in the program should neither be collected nor
processed, given that the adversary is the data processor4 itself, having thus the
possibility to exploit the inputs.5 As a consequence the attacker knows all the
information available after the input is collected (before the program execution).
Given that input data = necessary data + extra data, and since the program
should execute equally well without any extra data, we have that input data ≥
necessary data. The goal of the data minimisation process is thus to minimise
the input data so only what is necessary is given to the program. Whenever the
input data exactly matches what is necessary we may say that the minimisation
is the best. Best minimisation is, however, difficult to achieve in general among
other things because it is not trivial to exactly determine what is the input
needed to compute each possible output.
Let us consider a simple program to exemplify the notion of data minimi-
sation. The purpose of the program in Fig. 1 is to compute the benefit level
of employees depending on their salary (that we assume to be between $0 and
$100000). For the sake of simplicity, in what follows we do not assume any par-
ticular distribution over their domain for the inputs. We thus drive our analysis
on worst-case assumptions. A quick analysis shows that the range of the output
is {false, true}, and consequently the data processor does not need to precisely
know the real salaries of the employees to determine the benefit level. In prin-
ciple each employee should be able to give any number between 0 and 9999 as
input if they are eligible to the benefits, and any number between 10000 and
100000 otherwise, without disclosing their real salaries.
In this paper we address the issue of data minimisation with the following
contributions:
– We present different mechanisms and architectures to ensure data minimi-
sation (Section 2),
– We provide a formal definition of the concept of minimisers for a program
used to achieve data minimisation (Section 4) with respect to an explicit
attacker model (Section 3),
– We show how we can compare minimisers, leading to the definition of best
minimiser for a given program (Section 5), and
4 “Data controllers” and “data processors” are legal roles used to define obligations and
liabilities of the parties. We indistinctly use the term “data processor” in this paper
as we are interested in designating the party that technically processes the data.
5 In other scenarios the adversary only has access to the outputs (cf. [29]).
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– We propose a (semi-)procedure to generate minimisers and prove its sound-
ness and termination (Section 6).
In addition, we discuss a proof-of-concept implementation to compute minimis-
ers, based on symbolic execution and the use of a SAT solver, along with two
examples (Section 7). Finally we discuss related work (Section 8) before con-
cluding and giving future research directions (Section 9).
2 The When, How, and Where of Data Minimisation
Having informally introduced what minimality and minimisation are, the natural
question arising is how to achieve it. Indeed, various mechanisms can be used for
data minimisation, as detailed in Section 2.1 and can be performed in various
architectures, as described in Section 2.2.
2.1 Minimisation Mechanisms
The mechanisms used to test, check, verify, or enforce data minimisation appear
at different stages of the software lifecycle as illustrated in Table 1.
Before deployment Three kinds of analysis to perform data minimisation or
check minimality can be used before deployment: purely static, purely dynamic,
or both static and dynamic. Purely static mechanisms are used to perform a
verification of the minimality property or a synthesis of a minimiser, ie., a pre-
processor of the input which feeds minimalised data to the program(such as
the one presented in Figure 4 for the example of Pbl given in introduction in
Figure 1). The guarantee provided by such a static analysis is extremely strong
as it covers all the possible executions. To achieve this the source code of the
program is needed along with its specification. However, static analysis can be
expensive and may not alway be applicable. In that case one may turn to more
lightweight techniques.
At the other end of the spectrum, it is possible to use purely dynamic mech-
anisms to perform tests of the minimality property or to refine a pre-processor
to make it more minimising. In this case, the test strategy will choose some pos-
sible inputs and test whether or not some other inputs invalidate the minimality
property. For example, we could test Pbl with some input values, such as 0, 1000,
and 10000; the input values 0 and 1000 lead to the same output and would thus
reveal that the program has not been fully minimised. However, an absence of
common ouputs does not prove the program has been minimised. Giving weaker
guarantees than purely static techniques, purely dynamic techniques only need
a black box executable program to run tests (along with its specification).
A mix between static and dynamic analysis can be used by performing a static
analysis on a set of dynamically selected inputs (following a test strategy). For
example, it would be possible to perform a formal verification only for input
value 0 for Pbl. In this case, a result as good as the one obtained with the purely
3
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static approach could be obtained for this particular input, returning the set
of values {0, . . . , 9999} (all giving the same output). However, it does not give
any guarantee for the other input values. This approach gives strong guarantees
on the inputs covered, but does not cover the full domain of program inputs
(contrary to purely static approaches).
After deployment, both online and offline mechanisms can be run.
Online Concerning online mechanisms, only a mix of static and dynamic anal-
ysis or a purely dynamic approach can be used. Indeed, at this stage, it becomes
meaningless to perform a purely static analysis as such an analysis is needed
only once (it covers all the possible executions and thus is better run before
deployment as explained previously). A mixed analysis is based on the current
execution. In this case, it is still possible to reach strong guarantees about min-
imality or to get an input representative, ie., another input value hiding the
the actual input value while still preserving correctness, which ensures minimal-
ity. Indeed, while the purely static approach consisted in generating a minimiser
returning a representative for all the possible inputs, only the representative cor-
responding to the current execution is computed here. Returning to the example
of Pbl, a client whose salary is of 8000 will execute the minimisation mechanism
before disclosing this data. Thus, a representative (for instance, 0) will be fixed
at this time to hide the actual salary to the server without changing the result of
the computation. As a consequence, the computation is more efficient but still
relies on a white box program along with its specification and data relative to
the current execution.
If such conditions are not acceptable, it is also possible to get better effi-
ciency at the cost of weaker guarantees by using a purely dynamic approach.
This consists in testing whether or not the previous executions with similar in-
puts led to the same output, meaning the minimality property is not reached.
Returning again to our example, let us say the salary is to be disclosed every
month and there has already been a disclosure of 7000 the previous month. In-
stead of disclosing its current salary of 8000, the client will reuse the previously
disclosed value of 7000 as it leads to the same output value. In this case, it has
to be highlighted that even if the test or the refinement is performed against
all the previous executions, the minimality property cannot be guaranteed as
there might be more information leaking without it being witnessed by the past
behaviours.
Instead of relying on previous executions, the dynamic analysis could also
rely on arbitrary values, following a test strategy, as depicted for mechanisms
run before deployment. In this case, an access to the black box program is
necessary instead of the previous executions. For the sake of simplicity, we do
not show this case in the Table 1 as it does not appear to make an interesting
case in practice.
Offline Finally, offline mechanisms rely on execution logs to audit minimality.
They also allow to get guarantees as strong as previously in the mixed static
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and log analysis. As for the previous kinds of analysis, this requires a white box
program along with its specification. In this case, all the behaviours belonging
to the execution log are verified individually in a way very similar to the online
mechanism.
A weaker analysis, similar to the online dynamic one, can also be performed
here, only relying on logs. This monitoring approach only consider all the execu-
tions recorded in the logs and are only able to find witnesses of non-minimality.
For instance, if two executions have been logged disclosed inputs 7000 and 8000
(both leading to the same output), the auditor knows that more data than needed
has been disclosed.
It could also be possible here to monitor each past execution against arbitrary
values given by a monitoring strategy (similarly to test strategies). This would
require an access to the black box program and would give similarly weak results.
This possibility has not been added to the Table 1 as it does not seem useful in
practice.
Data minimisation itself can only be performed before deployment or online.
Indeed, after execution, an offline approach is only able to detect breaches in
minimality. As such, it is not a proper privacy-by-design practice and should not
be used alone. However, this approach is still useful as it is the more likely to be
used in already existing systems (as it would be extremely ambitious to hope all
systems managing personal data to be redesigned according to privacy-by-design
guidelines). Another use of online and offline mechanisms is their application by
an external entity, such as a data protection authority, to perform sporadic con-
trols (with the caveat that such controls could be subject to attacks depending
on prior mechanisms run on data by the server).
The way that these mechanisms are applied may depend on the system ar-
chitecture. Thus they may provide different guarantees as discussed below.
2.2 Minimisation Architectures
The kind of minimality and minimisation achievable by these mechanisms de-
pend on when and where they are performed as shown in Table 2.
For mechanisms run before deployment or online, different kinds of minimal-
ity are applicable and different privacy properties can be targeted depending on
the architecture.
Kind of Minimality Depending on the architecture, different kinds of minimal-
ities can be achieved, denoted monolithic minimality and distributed minimality.
Monolithic minimality is a minimality property expressed in the context where
knowledge about all input values is accessible at a centralised location where the
mechanism can be applied. On the other hand, distributed minimality is used for
the cases where the input values and the associated mechanism are distributed,
in which case the mechanism has only the knowledge available at its location. If
the mechanism is performed by a client then only monolithic minimality can be
achieved. On the other hand, if the mechanism is performed by a third-party or
6
Table 2: Kind of minimality applicable and privacy property targeted by minimisation
mechanisms in a distributed architecture.
Timing of
mechanism
Location of
mechanism
Kind of minimality
applicable
Privacy property
targeted
before deployment
clients distributed collection minimisation3rd party monolithicserver use minimisation
online
clients distributed collection minimisation3rd party monolithicserver use minimisation
offline
clients distributed
breach detection3rd party monolithicserver
PM
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, …, run
) o
P
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ServerClients
Monolithic minimisation Distributed minimisation
Fig. 2: Monolithic and distributed minimisation architectures.
by the server, then monolithic minimality is achieved as there is full knowledge
about input values.
Privacy Properties The kind of privacy property that can be achieved depends
on when in the data lifecycle the methods are deployed. Collection minimisation
prevents data from being collected by the server (this is the case when the client
itself, or a trusted third-party, performs the minimisation). On the other hand,
use minimisation is only able to limit the use of the data (this is the case when
the server itself is also in charge of performing the minimisation6).
We note that the only way to implement collection minimisation while en-
suring monolithic minimality in a distributed setting is by using a third party to
perform the minimisation. Indeed, it is not possible to reach a property stronger
than distributed minimality when the minimisation is applied client-side.
Figure 2 gives an illustration of monolithic vs. distributed minimisation in
the case of a static minimiser generated before deployment, and run by the client
(thus guaranteeing collection minimisation).
In the following, we detail the attacker model used to formally characterise
the notion of minimality. In the following, unless otherwise stated, will focus
on the static mechanism built before deployment for verification purposes; this
6 One could argue that it is already too late in this case, but the server could belong
to a multi-server organisation, thus minimising potential subsequent disclosures (not
treated in this paper).
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is the most complex case, and the other mechanisms can be seen as weakened
versions of this one.
3 Attacker Model
In order to define data minimisation we have to consider an explicit attacker
model. For example, if the computation performed on the data is really just the
intended program P , then why worry about minimisation? In practice a mali-
cious7 server may have a secondary use for the data (defined as “using personal
data in a different way than the primary reason why they were collected” [7]).
We define here an attacker model having the following components: (i) an ex-
plicit model of a hidden secondary use of the data, and (ii) an explicit model of
what the attacker learns about the data from observing the result of processing
the data. We will develop a definition of minimisation which guarantees that an
attacker learns no more about the private data than he can deduce from the
legitimate output of the program.
To model the hidden secondary use, we suppose the attacker uses a second
program denoted by a function h ∈ I → O′. Thus the attacker is defined by
a pair of functions p and h (the legitimate use and the hidden use of the data,
respectively), and the attacker’s computation is given by the function 〈p, h〉 ∈
I → O ×O′ defined by
〈p, h〉(i) def= (p(i), h(i))
The goal of the attacker is to learn something about the inputs by observing
the output of 〈p, h〉. In the following section we will show that if the input is first
minimised using a best possible minimiser, then what the attacker learns from
〈p, h〉 is no more than what is learned by p alone. To do this we model the attacker
knowledge explicitly, as has become more common in recent formulations of the
semantics of information flow (e.g. [3, 4, 6]).
Definition 1 (Knowledge). Let u ∈ I be an input, and f a function in I → O.
We say the knowledge about u obtained through f by observing f(u), written
K(f, u), is defined to be the set {v | f(u) = f(v), v ∈ I}.
Thus K(f, u) is the largest set of possible input values that could have led to
the output value f(u). This corresponds to an attacker who knows the function
f and the output f(u) and makes perfect logical deduction about the possibles
values of the input. Note that the smaller the knowledge set, the less uncertainty
the observer has over the possible value of the input.
7 In security literature, a malicious attacker is an attacker which does not follow the
protocol while an attacker only attempting at extracting more information from what
he got is called honest-but-curious. In the privacy context, the (security) honest-but-
curious attacker cannot be considered as honest because personal data should not
be used for another purpose than the one specified and consented for by the data
subject. As a consequence, this is also considered as a malicious behaviour.
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The knowledge relation induces an order on programs: the bigger the knowl-
edge set for a given input, the lesser a program will disclose information about
the input. This is reasonable given that if more input values are mapped to the
same output, more difficult it will be to guess what is the exact input when ob-
serving the output of a computation. We have then the following order between
programs:
Definition 2 (Disclosure ordering). We say f discloses less or as much in-
formation as g, written f v g, iff for any u ∈ I we have K(g, u) ⊆ K(f, u).
If f and g are knowledge equivalent, we write f ≡ g. For example, func-
tions denoted by (·mod2) and (·mod4) (with postfix notation) are related by
(·mod2) v (·mod4) (knowing the last bit discloses less information than know-
ing the last two bits). However, (· > 0) is incomparable to either of them.
4 Data Minimisers
In this section we develop a definition of a minimiser for a program. We will
consider two types of minimiser depending on how the data is collected: mono-
lithic and distributed. Monolithic collection describes the simple case when the
personal data is collected from a single location (e.g. a single data subject). On
the other hand, distributed collection occurs when personal data is collected
from different sources. In the latter case we assume these sources do not interact
to achieve a multi-party data minimisation. This assumption is important as it
has a strong impact to the kind of minimisers which may be feasible in practice.
The execution of a program consists in the computation of an output, de-
pending on the inputs provided. The domain of possible inputs can be arbitrarily
large and complex. Running a data minimiser before a program is intended to
capture the idea that the program will be given less data. In the best case, only
the data actually needed to produce the result will be provided. Thus it implies
that the system does not receive more sensitive data than it needs.
We will address the whole data minimisation process by the following steps:
(i) data minimiser generation (from the program, performed client-, server-, or
third-party-side), (ii) data minimisation per se (ie. data minimiser execution,
performed client-side), (iii) data collection (ie. representative transmission to
the server, performed client-side), and (iv) program execution (performed server-
side). Note that a minimiser only needs to be generated only once for a given
program: the same can be used for all clients. This section and the following one
are mainly concerned with the first of these steps (the other steps being simple
executions and communications). The improvement in the minimality of a given
program is achieved by constructing a minimiser M .
In the following we assume the data processor to be the malicious attacker
depicted in Section 3 and the data sources to be as trustable as they would be
without data minimisation. The data minimiser could be sent as part of the
protocol for data collection. This may be done by a third-party or by the data
9
1 input ( x1 , x2 , x3 ) ;
2 y := 0 ;
3 i f ( x2 == x2 ; )
4 then (y := ( x3 + x1 − x3 ) ; )
5 output (y ) ;
Fig. 3: Example of a semantically unnecessary syntactic necessity.
1 input ( s a l a r y )
2 repr_sa lary := 0
3 i f (10000 <= sa l a r y )
4 then ( repr_sa lary := 10000)
5 output ( repr_sa lary )
Fig. 4: Minimiser for Pbl (see Figure 1).
processor itself. Thus we assume that the data source knows how much data is
minimised on its side, but may not be able to check the optimality of the whole
minimiser. A third-party provider for the data minimiser could help to get this
assurance. Note, however, that the fact that the specification is being determined
by the data processor itself does not weaken (nor strengthen) the security and
trust assumptions of the interactions between the parties.
4.1 Minimisation Semantics
Let us consider the program in Fig. 3 to discuss the need for a semantic definition
of minimisation. In this program, x2 is syntactically needed to evaluate the
condition (l.3). However, this condition always evaluates to true. In the same
way, x3 is not semantically needed to compute the value of y since it is both
added and substracted (l.4). As a consequence, it would be possible to get the
same result by rewriting the program with only the input x1 without modifying
its behavior. If x2 and x3 are personal data, then the semantic approach is
better likely to help us to limit the collection than the syntactic approach. So,
the program could be refactored by taking only the input x1 while retaining
the same output behaviour. Though this would work, this approach requires a
change in both the data collected and in the interface of the program.
Instead, we propose to keep the program unchanged and we rely on the idea
that the information behind x2 and x3 (in this specific example) can be protected
by providing fixed arbitrary values for them, instead of refactoring the program.
This means the program does not need to be modified for the data processor
to propose better guarantees. This approach allows a better modularity and a
better integration in the software development cycle. To see this, let us consider
the program shown in Fig. 1. In this case, any employee earning less than $10000
can disclose any figure between 0 and 9999 and any employee earning at least
$10000 can disclose any figure between 10000 and 100000 without affecting the
output of the program. Thus a corresponding data minimiser could be as shown
in Fig. 4, where the representative values are taken to be 0 and 10000.
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The value output by this minimiser, which is the value of repr_salary,
can then be provided as input to the corresponding program (standing for the
variable salary). The behaviour of the program will remain the same while the
actual salary of the employee is not needlessly passed to the program. This holds
even when an employee earns exactly the amount of repr_salary since the data
processor receiving this value cannot distinguish when it is the case or not.
Following the approach about data minimality, we study in turn both mono-
lithic and distributed cases as shown in Fig. 2 where M and
⊗n
i=0Mi are a
monolithic and a distributed minimiser respectively (each Mi being a local min-
imiser), P is the program, ui are input values, rui are input representatives,
and o are outputs. We then discuss about security properties achieved through
composition of minimisers and programs.
4.2 Monolithic Case
Let us assume a program P constituting a legitimate processing of sensitive
(personal) data for which the data subject had consented to the purpose. We
abstract it through a function p which ranges over I → O. Since we aim at
building pre-processors for the program, we consider a minimiser m with type
I → I.
As stated previously, monolithic collection refers to the case when there is
only one data source from which data is collected before being processed. This
data source can thus minimise the data disclosed while having full knowledge
about the input that are provided to the processor. Thus the output of a data
minimiser M can be directly input to the program P .
Definition 3 (Monolithic minimiser). We say m is a monolithic minimiser
for p iff (i) p ◦ m = p and (ii) m ◦ m = m.
Condition (i) on the above definition is basically correctness: it states that
using the pre-processor does not change the result of the computation. Condi-
tion (ii) ensures that m chooses representative inputs in a canonical way. Put
it another way, m has the job of removing information from the input. This
idempotency condition states that m removes all the information in one go.
4.3 Distributed Case
In general a computation over private data may require data collected from
several independent sources. We will thus extend our definition to the distributed
setting. This is the general case where a program dp is a function of a product
of input domains such that dp ∈ ∏ni=0 Ii → O. The idea for the distributed
minimiser will be to have a local minimiser mi ∈ Ii → Ii for each source Ii,
combined into an input processor as dm =
⊗n
i=0mi, where for f ∈ A → A′
and g ∈ B → B′ we have f ⊗ g ∈ A × B → A′ × B′. This is based on the
assumption that each argument of dp is provided by a different data source and
hence requires its own data processing.
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Definition 4 (Distributed minimiser). We say dm is a distributed min-
imiser for dp iff (i) dm is a monolithic minimiser for dp and (ii) dm has the
form
⊗n
i=0 dmi (with dmi being Ii → Ii functions (called local minimisers, for
i ∈ {0, . . . , n})).
The first condition ensures that dm is actually a minimiser while the second
condition (ii) ensures that each input is treated independently. This second con-
dition is the key differentiator between monolithic and distributed minimisers.
Each function dmi is only provided with an input from Ii. Intuitively, this means
that if two input values at a given position belong to the same equivalence class,
then it has to be the case that this holds for all values possibly provided for
the other positions. For example, if the values 0 and 1 from I0 belong to the
same equivalence class, then each pair of input tuples 〈0, x, y〉 and 〈1, x, y〉 for
any (x, y) ∈ ∏2i=1 Ii have to belong to the same equivalence class (two by two,
meaning these can be different classes for each pair: 〈0, 1, 2〉 and 〈1, 1, 3〉 may
not belong to the same equivalence class, though 〈0, 1, 2〉 and 〈1, 1, 2〉 have to).
This is formally stated in Proposition 1 below, which relies on the definition of
the kernel of a function.
Definition 5 (Kernel of a function). If f ∈ I → O then the kernel of f is
defined as ker(f) = {(u, v) | f(u) = f(v)}.
So, the kernel ker(f) induces a partition of the input set where every element in
the same equivalence class is mapped to the same output.
Proposition 1. If m is a monolithic minimiser for p, then m is a distributed
minimiser for p iff for all (u,v) ∈ ker(m), for all input positions i, and all input
vectors w,
(w[i 7→ ui],w[i 7→ ui]) ∈ ker(m)
where the notation w[i 7→ ui] denotes a vector like w except at position i where
it has value ui.
This proposition gives a data-based characterisation of data minimisation.
This will be useful when building minimisers in Section 6. Before building min-
imisers, we explain how to compare them in the next section.
5 Best Minimisers
Now that we defined minimisers as pre-processors modifying the input, we see
that there may exist many different minimisers for a given program. Thus we
are interested in being able to compare these minimisers. Indeed, since the iden-
tity function is a minimiser for any program p, then it is clear that the simple
existence of a minimiser does not guarantee any kind of minimality. One way
to compare minimisers is to compare the size of their ranges – a smaller range
indicates a greater degree of minimality (cf. Proposition 2 below). But a more
precise way to compare them is by understanding them in terms of the lattice of
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equivalence relations [26], which has been used to model dependency properties
of programs in several works, e.g. [17, 19,28].
The set of equivalence relations on I forms a complete lattice, with the
ordering relation given by set-inclusion of their defining sets of pairs. The identity
relation (which we denote IdI) is the bottom element, and the total relation
(which we denote AllI) is the top.
The following proposition provides some properties about the order relation
between programs (cf. Definition 2), including its relation with the kernel.
Proposition 2 (Disclosure ordering properties).
1. f v g iff ker(g) ⊆ ker(f)
2. f ◦ g v g
3. 〈f, f〉 v f
4. f v 〈f, g〉
5. f v g implies |range(f)| ≤ |range(g)|
where the notation 〈f, g〉 a function denoting a mapping of an argument to each
one of f and g as defined in Section 3.
5.1 Monolithic Case
In order to reason about minimisers we need to be able to compare them. The
ordering relation between programs defined above may be specialised to min-
imisers: m is a better minimiser for p than n is iff (i) m and n are minimisers for
p and (ii) m v n. Of particular interest is the minimiser that fulfill its purpose
in the best way:
Definition 6 (Best monolithic minimiser). We say that m is a best mono-
lithic minimiser for p iff (i) m is a monolithic minimiser for p and (ii) m v n
for any n a minimiser for p.
A minimiser carrying less information than the best minimiser could not
convey all the information necessary for the program p to keep the same be-
haviour under all inputs. In this simple (monolithic) form, minimisation is easily
understood as injectivity:
Proposition 3 (Monolithic best minimiser injectivity). A monolithic min-
imiser m for a program p is a best one iff p|range(m) is injective (with p|range(m)
the restriction of the program p over the range of m).
Now we can show that using a minimiser m at the client guarantees that the
attacker 〈p, h〉 learns no more about the input than which can be learned by
observing the output of the legitimate use p (the proof follows from the ordering
between minimisers and Proposition 2):
Theorem 1. If m is a best monolithic minimiser for p then for any hidden use
h we have 〈p, h〉 ◦m ≡ p.
13
Proof.
p ≡ p ◦m (m is a minimiser for p)
v 〈p ◦m,h ◦m〉 (Prop. 2(4))
≡ 〈p, h〉 ◦m (=)
〈p, h〉 ◦m v m (m is a minimiser for p,
Prop. 2(2))
v 〈p,m〉 (Prop. 2(4))
v 〈p, p〉 (Def. 2)
v p (Prop. 2(3))
Finally, we note that:
Theorem 2. For every program p there exists a best monolithic minimiser.
5.2 Distributed Case
As for the monolithic case, we have an ordering between distributed minimisers.
The notion of a best minimiser also exists in the distributed case and restricts
the monolithic case definition as follows:
Definition 7 (Best distributed minimiser).We say dm is a best distributed
minimiser for dp iff (i) dm is a distributed minimiser for dp and (ii) dm v dn
for any dn a distributed minimiser for dp.
The following result shows that there always exists a best distributed min-
imiser (see proof in Appendix A).
Theorem 3. For every distributed program dp there exists a best distributed
minimiser.
Note, however, that there is a price to be paid for having distributed minimisers:
the best distributed minimiser may reveal more information than the best mono-
lithic minimiser for a given function. An example is the Boolean OR function
where the identity function is a best distributed minimiser, but in the monolithic
case we can minimise further by mapping (0, 0) to itself, and mapping all other
inputs to (1, 1).
Similarly to what we did in the previous section with Proposition 1, we give
a data-based characterisation of best minimisers as follows.
Proposition 4 (Data-based best distributed minimisation). If dm is a
best distributed minimiser for dp, then for all input positions i, for all v1 and
v2 ∈ Ii such that v1 6= v2, there is some u ∈ range(dm) such that
dp (u[i 7→ v1]) 6= dp (u[i 7→ v2]) .
This property will prove useful in the next section to build minimisers.
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PC Sto: {salary→s}
S toPC: {true}
PC Sto: {salary→s, benefits→true}
S toPC: {s < 10000}
PC Sto: {salary→s, benefits→false}
S toPC: {s >=10000}
1
2 2
Pre: {0 ≤ s, s ≤ 100000}
Fig. 5: Symbolic execution tree of Pre (see Figure 1).
DataMin
Symbolic execution
(KeY Project)
Program
(Java source)
Preconditions
States
Path conditions Minimiser 
generation
Minimiser
(Java sources)
Diagnosis
Specification
(JML annotations)
Theorem solving
(Z3)
Characterisation
Symbolic
characterisation
Fig. 6: Toolchain of the (semi-)procedure to generate minimisers.
6 Building Minimisers
We describe here a procedure to build data minimisers. This (semi-) procedure
is not complete for the best minimisers since obtaining a best minimiser is not
computable in general. Besides, and more pragmatically, our procedure is built
on top of a theorem prover and a symbolic execution engine, and it is thus also
limited by the power of such tools in addition to the theoretical algorithmic
limits.
Only the main program (and optionally a specification overriding the implicit
specification embodied in the program itself) is needed to generate a minimiser.
Data minimisers thus generated are intended to be deployed either monolithically
or in a distributed manner with a part residing at each data collection point; each
data source locally executes the local minimising program before forwarding the
representative inputs to the data processor (i.e. the program).
Let us consider again the example described in Fig. 1 to give an intuition of
the way minimisers can be generated. In order to generate a data best minimiser
for the program we need to reason about the dependencies between the possible
outputs and the inputs considering all possible execution paths. A representation
of the possible paths for this program is shown in Fig. 5 where the digits 1 and
2 correspond to the lines of the program, Sto is the corresponding store, and PC
is the condition to be satisfied at this point (l.3 of the program does not have
any effect in this representation).
The possible execution paths for this program lead to two main outputs,
where either benefits == true or benefits == false. Thus the best min-
imiser generated should distinguish the two cases and return a representative
value leading to the same output as if the program were to be executed with
the “real” value assigned to salary. This is the case for the data minimiser de-
scribed in Fig. 4. Moreover, we see that any change of value for repr_salary
leads to a change in the salary computed by the main program. This means
this minimiser is indeed a best minimiser.
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The procedure to generate data best minimisers follows the toolchain de-
picted in Fig. 6. Before describing the procedure in detail, we briefly recall con-
cepts related to symbolic execution, since we run the program symbolically in
order to generate the best minimiser.
6.1 Symbolic Execution
This step corresponds to the two leftmost boxes of the toolchain shown in Fig. 6.
Symbolic execution has been pioneered in [18] as a way to reason about symbolic
states reached by a program execution.
A symbolic execution of a program is an execution of the program against
symbolic inputs. Expressions are symbolically evaluated and assigned to vari-
ables. The state of this execution includes the values of the program (modelled
as a mapping called store), and path conditions (boolean expressions ranging
over the symbolic inputs, specifying the conditions to be satisfied for a node
to be reached). Assignments modify the symbolic value of variables, whereas
conditions and loops create branches distinguished by their path conditions.
This symbolic execution generates a symbolic execution tree where each node
is associated to a statement and each arc is associated to a transition of the
program. A state is associated to each node and the root node corresponds to
the input of the program. Each leaf in the tree then corresponds to a completed
execution path, and no two leaves have the same path condition.
A key condition for the soundness of symbolic execution is the commutativity
of its semantics with respect to the concrete semantics of the language. This
means that executing the program symbolically on given symbolic values and
then concretising the output should give the same result as executing the original
program over the concretisation of the symbolic inputs.
The formal definition of this tree makes it possible to reason about the pro-
gram under analysis. However, some executions may lead to infinite trees in the
presence of loops (when they cannot be simply unfolded). In this case, in order
to get a procedure that terminates and provide conditions for getting a symbolic
execution of the program, one should provide loop invariants for each concerned
loop in the program. To find the best invariant is a difficult problem and still an
active field of research [12]. Failing to provide the best invariant may result in
weaker path conditions failing to capture all of what is theoretically knowable
about the states of the symbolic execution.
In our approach the program P is symbolically executed along with the as-
sertions coming from the specification S. We assume that we have a global
precondition for the program P , given in the specification S of the program, de-
noted Pre〈P, S〉. This specification can be expressed explicitly (with annotations
in the source code of P for example), or implicitly (by e.g. analyzing the range
of the program during the symbolic execution). In our example, the conditions
0 ≤ s and s ≤ 100000 are part of the preconditions as shown in Fig. 5. This
execution produces a symbolic execution tree equipped with the corresponding
path conditions PC and Sto attached to its nodes.
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In what follows we define a symbolic characterisation of the program P under
specification S capturing the conditions at the termination of the execution.
Definition 8 (Symbolic characterisation of a program). We say Γ is a
symbolic characterisation of a program P under specification S, written Γ〈P,S〉,
iff Γ collects the preconditions, stores, and path conditions to be satisfied for
each possible output of P : Γ〈P,S〉 , Pre〈P, S〉∧
(∨
l∈Leaves〈P,S〉 (PC(l) ∧ Sto(l))
)
,
where Leaves〈P, S〉 returns the leaves of the symbolic execution tree of P under
specification S, and PC(·) and Sto(·) return the path condition and the state
associated to a leaf, respectively.
For the example in Fig. 1, the (simplified) symbolic characterisation is: Γ〈Pbl ,Sbl〉 =
(0 ≤ s ∧ s ≤ 100000) ∧ ((s < 10000 ∧ salary = s ∧ benefits = true) ∨ (s ≥
10000 ∧ salary = s ∧ benefits = false))
The symbolic characterisation induces an equivalence class giving a partition
of the state space according to the different possible outputs. This is then used
by a solver to get a representative for each equivalence class, which is the next
step in our procedure.
6.2 Static Generation Before Deployment
In this section we show how best minimisers can be generated from the symbolic
execution tree. In the following, the monolithic case is seen as a specific case of
the distributed case: the former is reduced to a distributed case with only one
input. The construction spans over the two boxes of the toolchain in Fig. 6 as
detailed in the following paragraphs.
The input domain of the semantic function dp having n+1 inputs is
∏n
i=0 Ii
and the corresponding input variables of dp are denoted as xi. Each domain Ii is
determined implicitly by DP or explicitly by its specification S. A local function
dmi is generated for each input xi ∈ Input(DP). We are still interested in the
different possible outputs of dp but we cannot directly use its kernel as in the
monolithic case since this would require all the minimisers to have access to the
data at other data source points. Instead of this, each data source point assumes
that the data to be disclosed by other points can take any value in their domain.
Thus we need to compute, for each input variable xi, the equivalence classes
over its domain such that the value o of the output of the program remains
the same for any possible assignment to the other inputs variables xj for any
j ∈ ({0, . . . , n} \ {i}).
The algorithm of Fig. 7 shows how the distribution of the inputs is taken
into account. Here, min (l.1) stands for the minimiser being built (as a map
containing the local minimiser min[i] (l.5) for each input i (l.3)), Inputs (l.3) de-
notes the inputs of the program, and Γ (l.4) denotes the formula of the symbolic
characterisation of the program. The notation φ[y/x] denotes the formula φ in
which y replaces x and == the logical equality (l.8) while S \ s denotes S \ {s}
(the set S from which the element s has been substracted, l.9).
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1: min = {} . initialise minimiser
2: decl logical_variable i′ . declare a new logical variable
3: for all i ∈ Inputs do . iterate over the inputs
4: γ = Γ . copy the program symbolic characterisation to γ
5: min[i] = {} . initialise minimiser for input i
6: while γ.check() do . call solver to loop as long as γ is satisfiable
7: model = γ.model() . call solver to get a valid assignment for γ
8: formula = i′ == model[i] ∧ Γ ∧ Γ [i′/i] . build distributed
minimisation formula
9: formula = ∃i′.∀(Inputs \ i) ∈ Dom(Inputs \ i).∃o.formula . introduce
quantifiers except for i
10: wp = formula.quantif_elim() . call solver to eliminate quantifiers
11: min[i]+= (wp,model[i]) . add weakest precondition with
representative to minimiser
12: γ = γ ∧ ¬wp . conjunct negation of the weakest precondition to γ to
limit the loop
13: end while
14: end for
Fig. 7: Distributed data minimiser generation (excerpt).
Primitives depending on a theorem prover are called at three locations in
the algorithm. The first one, check() (l.6) checks whether or not a logical for-
mula is satisfiable. Then, model() (l.7) applied to a formula returns a satisfying
valuation. These two primitives are linked as it is only possible to find such a
valuation for satisfiable formula. Finally, quantif_elim() (l.10) is a procedure to
eliminate (both universal and existential) quantifiers in a formula, thus simpli-
fying a formula by removing the corresponding symbols.
After having initialised the data structure min holding the minimisers as a
map from inputs i to tuples (weakest precondition, representative) (l.1), a new
logical variable i′ is declared (l.2). At this point, all the inputs (from Inputs
(l.3)) and the output o of the program already exist as logical variables (im-
plicitly introduced with Γ which is an input of this algorithm). The rationale
to introduce a new logical variable i′ is because it is used to control variations
on one input during the procedure (l.8-9). Then, the algorithm iterates over all
the inputs (l.3). The symbolic characterisation Γ is assigned to the variable γ
(l.4) (which will be reinitialised at each iteration of the loop of l.3). The original
Γ will be used to build formulas to be solved while the fresher γ will be used
to control the loop of l.6. The minimiser min is then initialised for the current
input i (l.5). The algorithm should then loop over all equivalence classes for the
current input i. This is ensured by (i) representing each equivalence class by its
weakest precondition wp (l.7-11), (ii) conjuncting the negation of the weakest
precondition wp found to the symbolic characterisation γ (l.11), and (iii) loop-
ing as long as there is another equivalence class (ie, weakest precondition) to be
covered by checking the satisfiability of γ conjuncted with the negation of all
previous conditions (l.6).
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We now explain in more detail how the weakest preconditions are found (l.7-
11). A satisfying valuation of the characterisation γ is requested from the solver
and assigned to the variable model (l.7). The valuation of variable x can be
called by model[x]. A formula (assigned to the variable formula) is then built in
two steps. First, we conjunct Γ , Γ [i′/i], and the formula i′ == model[i] (l.8).
This fixes Γ [i′/i] to the case where i′ is equal to the satisfying valuation found
previously (l.7). Then we introduces quantifiers for all the free logical variables
except for i to get the data-based characterisation of data minimisation as given
by Proposition 1 (l.9). The output o is existentially quantified as it can freely
vary without any other constraint than those imposed by the Γ s. All the inputs
except for i and i′ are universally quantified because the characterisation states
that the preservation of the functional correctness (implied by the value of the
output o here) has to be guaranteed for all possible variations of inputs (except
for inputs i and i′). Finally, the input i′ is existentially quantified only for the
purpose of being eliminated later (free variables are existentially quantified for
SAT solvers). Once the formula has been built, the quantifiers are eliminated
by calling the suitable procedure from a solver (l.10). This gives the weakest
precondition corresponding to an equivalence class of the inputs (the one corre-
sponding to the value of model[i]). This equivalence class wp is then added to
the minimiser min[i] along with its representative model[i] (l.11) before being
excluded from the control γ (l.12) before a new iteration, until exhaustion of
equivalence classes (l.6).
Theorem 4 (Soundness). The algorithm of Fig. 7 builds a best distributed
minimiser dm for program dp.
The soundness of this algorithm relies on Proposition 4, on the fact that the
representative assigned to each equivalence class is fixed, and on the proof of
existence in Appendix A.
Theorem 5 (Termination). The algorithm of Fig. 7 terminates when the
number of inputs, the number of equivalence classes on these inputs, and the
calls to the external solver terminate.
This is proven by showing that all the loops in the algorithm iterate over sets
built from inputs and equivalence classes. The set of inputs is not modified in
the loops while the condition of (l.6) strictly decreases in terms of the number of
times it is satisfiable. However, it terminates only if there is a finite number of
equivalence classes for the current input. Since we depend on external procedures,
the termination condition also rely on these ones satisfying this condition. In
practice, this is only a semi-procedure.
In both the monolithic and the distributed cases, generating a minimiser may
give interesting insights about the process. It can be used to get metrics, such as
the number of equivalence classes finally obtained, to compare with the initial
size of the input domain. It could also be used for quantitative (information-
theoretic) analysis.
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6.3 Other Mechanisms
The mechanism presented in the previous section is the most expensive to de-
ploy. Indeed, the static approach requires computation of all the (symbolically)
possible cases. Thus, each of the calls to the external solver in the algorithm
depicted Fig. 7 occurs
∑
i∈Inputs#equivClassesi times with #equivClassesj be-
ing the number of equivalence classes for the input i (there is in fact one more
call for the satisfiability check (l.6)). This cost is hard to predict in advance.
Indeed, programs which can be highly minimised and end up with few equiva-
lence classes can offer good performance, but quasi-injective programs may have
a large number of equivalence classes.
This complexity justifies the need of other mechanisms such as the ones
presented in Table 1. All these other mechanisms allow the reduction of the
complexity by limiting the domain of verification. To effectively use data minimi-
sation, it is thus necessary in general to choose easier mechanisms. For instance,
the static and dynamic mechanisms run online after deployment leads to only∑
i∈Inputs 1 = |Inputs| calls to the external procedures since the input is known
at run-time. However, this still needs to call semi-decidable external procedures,
which may create a large overhead. If weaker guarantees are acceptable, then it
is possible to use test strategies which verify only partial domains.
7 Implementation and Examples
In this section we present DataMin, an implementation of the procedure to
generate a minimiser. Two examples are then given to illustrate the notions of
data minimality and data minimisation. The first example contains a loop and
lies in the monolithic case while the second example focuses on a distributed
setting to illustrate the distributed minimisation.
7.1 DataMin Implementation
The (semi-)procedure described in the previous section has been implemented
in the Python language as a proof of concept named DataMin.We rely on the
Symbolic Execution Engine of the KeY Project [16]. This symbolic executor
is run against a program P written in Java source code for which a minimiser
should be generated.
The program can be instrumented with Java Modeling Language (JML) an-
notations [20] to help KeY with the exploration of the states space. They can
be used to give a specification S of the domain of inputs under normal behavior
for the program according to the design-by-contract terminology [23] (written
//@ requires P with P a property assumed to be verified). The annotations can
also be helpful when dealing with loops that cannot be unfolded. In this case,
a loop invariant can be provided (written //@ maintaining P, with P the loop
invariant) along with a description of a decreasing term to ensure termination
(written //@ decreasing t, with t the decreasing term).
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The symbolic execution results in the definition of stores and path conditions
for each leaf of the symbolic execution tree along with the preconditions when
applicable. DataMin generates the symbolic characterisation Γ〈P,S〉 and builds
the partitioning k〈P,S〉 and the sectioning r〈P,S〉 functions. The theorem prover
Z3 [24] is called through its API to solve constrains as needed during these steps.
This proof-of-concept supports only a limited range of data structures but could
be extended thanks to the many theories on which Z3 relies.
Finally, DataMin generates the minimiser as a set of Java source code files
to be run by the data source points before disclosing the data. These files are
directly compilable and ready to be exported as Java libraries to ease their
use. This whole process currently runs in reasonable time for these examples
(less than a second, given that Python is run in its interpreted mode). For the
first example, the solver used (Z3 ) is not able to totally perform quantification
elimination. We thus checked the results hold by manually verifying them using
the Redlog system [10]. This is a limitation of the external tools and not of the
procedure proposed in this paper.
7.2 Loyalty Status
The first example proposes a situation where an airport facility must deliver
different services to different customers depending on their status. This status
level is determined depending on the number of flights made by the customer in
the previous year with its favorite company, PrivaFly. This number of flights is
disclosed by the company to the airport.
However, PrivaFly wants to adopt the best practices in personal data pro-
tection and requires that only the needed data should be disclosed. The airport
services have their own policy to compute the status level, as shown in Fig. 8.
The method compStatusLevel takes a number of flights and returns a status
level. If the number of flights is lower than 9, the status is 0. From 10 to 19 flights,
the status level is equal to the number of flights from which 10 is substracted.
For a number of flights ranging from 20 to 29, the computation involves a loop
and will be detailed later. Finally, over 30 flights, the status level is capped to
500. The first JML annotation (l.2) specifies a range for the input domain. Then,
the following annotations from (l.9-13) will be described later.
Intuitively, there is no need to give a precise value for a number of flights
between 0 and 9 and over 30. On the other hand, the exact number should
be disclosed between 10 and 19. The program Mls from Fig. 9 is the result of
running DataMin on Pls (see Fig. 8). In this program, the complex (weakest
pre)conditions for each equivalence class returned by DataMin have been re-
placed by placeholders wpi (with i a number). Each of these conditions depends
only on the input of the minimiser (here, on the variable flights) in order to
be executable.
We can see that the intuition above is partially confirmed by the minimiser
generated. The representatives chosen by the minimiser for repr_flights are
the minimum of the corresponding equivalence classes. As a consequence it has
been fixed to 0 when the actual number of flights ranges from 0 to 10 (l.4 of
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1 public class LoyaltyApp {
2 //@ requires (0 <= flights) && (flights <= 100);
3 public int compStatusLevel(int flights) {
4 int status ;
5 if ( flights < 10) { status = 0; }
6 else if ( flights < 20) { status = ( flights − 10); }
7 else if ( flights < 30) {
8 status = 0; int i = 0;
9 //@ maintaining (0 <= i)
10 //@ && (i <= flights − 19)
11 //@ && (status == i ∗ flights );
12 //@ decreasing ( flights − 19 − i);
13 //@ assignable \strictly_nothing;
14 while ( i <= flights − 20) {
15 status = (status + flights );
16 i = i + 1; }
17 if (status > 150) { status = 150; } }
18 else { status = 500; }
19 return status ; } }
Fig. 8: Program Pls to compute a loyalty status.
1 public class LoyaltyAppMin_flights {
2 public int minimise_compStatusLevel(int flights) {
3 int repr_flights ;
4 if (wp1) { repr_flights = 0; }
5 else if (wp2) { repr_flights = 11; }
...
18 else if (wp15) { repr_flights = 24; }
19 else if (wp16) { repr_flights = 25; }
20 else { repr_flights = 30; }
21 return repr_flights ; } }
Fig. 9: Minimiser Mls for Pls (see Fig. 8).
the minimiser). We observe 10 is included (case not captured by the following
conditionals of the minimiser) despite the fact it is not captured by the first
conditional of the program (l.5) but by the second one (l.6). However, since the
status level is also equal to 0 in this case, it belongs to the same equivalence
class as the number of flights captured by the first conditional. For a number of
flights between 11 and 19, the output is different each time (number of flights
minus 10). Thus the representative is the number of flights itself (l.5-13 of the
minimiser). The case of a number of flights greater than 30 is trivially captured
by a representative fixed to 30 as well (l.20).
Between 20 and 29 flights, the status is computed thanks to a loop (l.14-
16 of the program). The code makes the status level computed after this point
to be equal to the number of flights multiplied by the same number minus 19.
The symbolic executor of KeY is not able to solve this loop itself and an in-
variant (maintaining) has been provided (l.9-11). These relations described by
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Table 3: Equivalence classes for Pls (see Fig. 8).
invariant variables \ values [0, 9] 10 [11, 19] [20, 24] [25, 29] [30, 100]
flights 1st if 2nd if 3rd if final else
best repr_flights 1 class 9 classes 5 classes 1 class 1 class
weak repr_flights 1 class 9 classes 5 classes 5 classes 1 class
Note: Correspondance between flights and their representatives, mismatch
between syntactic structure (if conditionals) and semantic classes, and ef-
fects of weak invariants on the minimisation.
the loop invariant are true both at the beginning and at the end of each itera-
tion. The following annotation (decreasing, l.12) helps the executor with the
termination of the loop by providing a decreasing term. Finally, the last annota-
tion (assignable, l.13) also helps the symbolic executor to handle the loop (by
declaring here that no side effect occurs). These annotations give to the symbolic
executor the best invariant. As a consequence, the data minimisation process is
able to propose a minimiser. The representatives for a number of flights from
20 to 24 correspond to the number of flights itself (l.14-18 of the minimiser).
This is not the case starting from 25 until 29 (l.19 of the minimiser) because the
status is capped at 150 when the number of flights is less than 30 and these five
possibilities constitute their own equivalence class.
If the invariant provided for the loop had not been the best invariant, the
equivalence class composed of a number of flights between 25 and 29 may not
have been detected. The representatives for these cases would have been the
actual number, leading to more disclosure than needed.
The observations made during this example are summed up in Table 3. The
table shows the mismatch between the syntactic structure of a program (mod-
elled in this table by the correspondence between the number of flights and the
if conditionals which are triggered) and the semantic equivalence classes. The
effect of strengthening an invariant is clear, and it shows the impact it may have
on the resulting pre-processor.
We have shown here an example of a monolithic minimiser. The following
example addresses the distributed case, when data comes from different sources.
7.3 Credit Score
This second example takes place from the point of view of PrivaLoan, a company
specialised in making loans to individual customers. To decide whether or not
loan is granted, PrivaLoan computes a credit score. This score depends on two
elements: the credit history and the tax category of the individual. These two
inputs are disclosed by two different parties: a central bank for the credit history
and the tax office for the tax category.
One of the competitive advantage of PrivaLoan on the credit market is that
it protects the privacy of the individuals asking for credit. This is achieved by
applying the limited collection principle to personal data requested to get an
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1 public class CreditApp {
2 //@ requires (0 <= incidents) && (incidents <= 3)
3 //@ && (1 <= tax) && (tax <= 3);
4 public int compCreditScore(int incidents, int tax) {
5 int creditScore ;
6 if ( incidents == 0) {
7 if (tax == 3) { creditScore = 2; }
8 else { creditScore = 1; } }
9 else if ( incidents == 1) { creditScore = 1; }
10 else { creditScore = 0; }
11 return creditScore ; } }
Fig. 10: Program Pcs to compute a credit score.
Table 4: Semantics of Pcs (see Fig. 10).
variables incidents
values 0 1 2 3
tax
1
1
02
3 2
Note: There are three equivalence classes
corresponding to the output values 0, 1,
and 2.
offer. The rules to decide on the credit risk of an individual are implemented in
the compCreditScore method of the program from Fig. 10. This method takes
two arguments: incidents, which ranges from 0 to 3 as a grade for the credit-
history of an individual, and tax, which ranges from 1 to 3 to indicate the tax
category to which the individual belongs. For an incident level of 2 or 3, the
credit score is 0, which means PrivaLoan does not want to make an offer. If the
incident level is 0 or 1, the credit score is 1, except when the incident level is 0
and the tax category is 3, which leads to a credit score of 2.
As can be seen in Table 4, which maps the value of creditScore as func-
tion of incidents and tax, some combinations of inputs return the same score.
Intuitively, there is no need for the central bank to make a distinction between
incidents of grade 2 and 3 since the output is the same. Similarly, the tax office
should not make a distinction between tax categories of 1 and 2. Indeed, for all
the possible values of incidents, the credit score does not change between a tax
category of 1 and one of 2 (though this score does not remain the same for all
values of incidents).
The minimisers Mcs,0 and Mcs,1 in Fig. 11 and 12 are output by DataMin
based on Pcs from Fig. 10. Both minimisers reflect the behavior described pre-
viously. As previously, we replaces the (weakest pre-)conditions by placeholders.
Indeed, the representative assigned for the equivalence class {2, 3} corresponds
to the minimum value of this set (l.5 of the minimiser for the variable incidents,
see Fig. 11). In all these cases, the value of the output of the program Pcs exe-
cution remains the same whichever the representative value chosen.
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1 public class CreditAppMin_incidents {
2 public int minimise_compCreditScore(int incidents) {
3 int repr_incidents;
4 if (wp1) { repr_incidents = 1; }
5 else if (wp2) { repr_incidents = 2; }
6 else { repr_incidents = 0; }
7 return repr_incidents; } }
Fig. 11: First input (incidents) minimiser Mcs,0 for Pcs (see Fig. 10).
1 public class CreditAppMin_tax {
2 public int minimise_compCreditScore(int tax) {
3 int repr_tax;
4 if (wp1) { repr_tax = 1; }
5 else { repr_tax = 3; }
6 return repr_tax; } }
Fig. 12: Second input (tax) minimiser Mcs,1 for Pcs (see Fig. 10).
Similarly for the minimiser for the variable tax (see Fig. 12), the representa-
tive computed for the equivalence class {1, 2} (l.4) can have any of these values
without changing the value of the final output (1 has been fixed here).
In all the other cases, the representative must have the same value as the
input variable (l.4 and l.6 of Mcs,0 and l.5 of Mcs,1). Indeed, without knowing a
priori the value that will be disclosed by the other data source point, each has
to assume it could be any value.
8 Related Work
Formal and rigorous approaches to privacy have long been advocated [30]. Many
different dimensions in this field have been explored but the data minimisation
principle seems not to have been precisely defined, as witnessed by [15], where
it is stated that “a whole family of design principles are lumped under the term
‘data minimisation” ’. A related work is the notion of minimal exposure [2]. This
consists in performing a preprocessing of information on the client’s side to give
only the data needed to benefit from a service. For instance, if the service to
which an individual requests can be modeled as a∨ b, then if a is true it will be
the only data disclosed: they reduce the number of inputs provided, but do not
reason on the domain of the inputs.
The semantics of minimality and data minimisation is closely related to in-
formation flow, and we have used several ideas from that area [9, 14, 19, 28]. A
semantic notion of dependency has been introduced in [22], where it is used to
characterise the subset of variables in an expression containing all and only the
variables that are semantically relevant for the evaluation of the expression. Our
notion is related to this (viewing the variables of an expression as the input, and
the value of the expression at the output), but much more fine-grained.
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A notable difference in the formalisation of minimality compared to usual
definitions of information flow is that minimality is a necessary and sufficient
condition on information flow, whereas most security formulations of informa-
tion flow are sufficient conditions only (e.g. noninterference: public inputs are
sufficient to compute public outputs). An exception here is Chong’s necessary
information release [8] which provides both upper and lower bounds on informa-
tion flows. For this reason many static analysis techniques that have been used
for security properties (e.g. type systems) are not easy to use for minimality –
an over-approximation to the information flows is not sound for minimality.
The necessary and sufficient conditions embodied in minimisers appeasr to be
closely related to the notion of completeness in abstract interpretation [13], where
a minimiser m plays the role of a complete abstraction. It is to be noted that
some work in the domain of quantitative information flow aiming at automated
discovery of leaks also rely on analysis of equivalence classes [5,21]. Compared to
our proof-of-concept tool, the approach of [5] contains several ideas that could
be beneficial to adopt in our tool.
The idea of equivalence partitioning by using symbolic execution has been
used previously in the context of test case generation in [27]. Testing is also
one of the uses of the symbolic execution as performed by the KeY theorem
prover [1]. We use the KeY tool in our work to symbolically execute the given
program, also exploiting the possibility of adding preconditions and invariants.
9 Conclusion
We have provided a formal definition of data minimisation in terms of strong
dependency and derived concepts. We have also formalised the notion of a data
minimiser as a pre-processor that may be composed with the data processor to
filter the inputs so the latter receives representative inputs for different equiva-
lence classes yielding the same output. We have considered the cases when the
input comes from a unique source (monolithic collection), and when they come
from different sources (distributed collection). We have also shown properties of
both kinds of data minimisers depending on when they are used (before deploy-
ment, online, or offline).
Besides the theoretical results, we have also introduced a procedure, and a
proof-of-concept implementation, to obtain data minimisers for a given program.
The procedure is a chain consisting of a symbolic execution of the program and
the use of a SAT solver to obtain a partition of the input space depending on
the different possible outputs. The procedure generates representatives for each
class which are outputs of the generated data minimiser to be fed as inputs into
the data processor.
Given the nature of the problem our approach is semantics-based, so finding
a distributed minimiser is undecidable in general. That said, as data has different
sensitivity depending on the application, and the desirable privacy level, we could
restrict the analysis to specific modules, making it tractable in some cases. The
approach might also have practical utility if we aim at using it in an interactive
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way, semi-automatically. One crucial issue in tackling realistic examples will
be finding compositional methods. One possible compositional proof rule is the
following: If m is a minimiser for p, n is a (distributed) minimiser for q and
range(q) ⊆ range(m) then n is a (distributed) minimiser for p ◦ q.
Note the special case when p is minimal (and hence m is the identity) for
which the condition range(q) ⊆ range(m) becomes vacuous. It remains to be
explored whether this has practical utility.
Our paper opens the way to other interesting research directions. On the
theoretical side it would be worth exploring the connections to completeness in
abstract interpretation as mentioned in the related work section. On the practical
side we are considering the possibility of defining a type system to determine
the cardinality of the needed inputs for computing a given output, and also the
integration of a quantitative approach based on worth-based information theory
to deal with the sensitivity of data.
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Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 3
Let ER(D) denote the equivalence relations over set D.
We view equivalence relations as sets of pairs, writing either aRb or (a, b) ∈
R when relation R relates a to b. Note that ER(D) forms a complete lattice
〈ER(D),⊥,>,≤,∨,∧〉 where ⊥ = {(a, a) | a ∈ D}, > = D × D, ≤ is subset
inclusion ⊆, ∨ is transitive closure of set union ∪∗, and ∧ is set intersection ∩.
Definition 9. Given R ∈ ER(D) and S ∈ ER(E) let R  S ∈ ER(D × E)
denote the relation (d, e)R S(d′, e′)⇔ dRd′ ∧ eSe′.
The lattice of equivalence relations ER(D) forms a complete lattice (stan-
dard) as described above.
Proposition 5.
{

i∈{0,...,n}
Ri | Ri ∈ ER(Di)
}
is a complete sub-lattice of
ER
( ∏
i∈{0,...,n}
Di
)
.
Proof. Note that in ER(D), ⊥ is the identity on D, written IdD and > is the
universal relation AllD.
It is easy to see that 
i∈{0,...,n}
IdDi = Id
(

i∈{0,...,n}
Di
) and 
i∈{0,...,n}
AllDi =
All(

i∈{0,...,n}
Di
).
Similarly, it is straightforward to show that

i∈{0,...,n}
Ri ∪ 
i∈{0,...,n}
Si = 
i∈{0,...,n}
(Ri ∪ Si) and similarly for ∩ (by observing
that union, intersection, and transitive closure all act pointwise on t-uples).
PROOF OF THE THEOREM
We need to prove that for any dp ∈
( ∏
i∈{0,...,n}
Ii
)
→ O, ∃dm = ⊗
i∈{0,...,n}
mi
such that dm is a best distributed minimiser for dp.
Proof. We first build a candidate dm, and by assuming that it is not a best
distributed minimiser, derive a contradiction.
Let E =
{

i∈{0,...,n}
Ri | Ri ∈ ER(Ii)
}
. Note that E is a complete sub-lattice
of ER
( ∏
i∈{0,...,n}
Ii
)
(by Proposition 5).
Define K = ∪∗{R ∈ E | R ⊆ ker dp}.
By the sub-lattice property of E above, K ∈ E, ie. K = ∏
i∈{0,...,n}
Ki for some
Ki ∈ ER(Ii) (for i ∈ {0, . . . , n}) and K ⊆ ker dp (since ker dp is an upper bound,
it is also an upper bound for the least upper bound).
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Now we define a candidate dm = ⊗
i∈{0,...,n}
mi. To do so, for each equivalence
class C of each Ki (for i ∈ {0, . . . , n}), choose a representative element denoted
repr(C).
Now define mi(v) , repr ([v]Ki), ie. mi maps a value into the representative
chosen for that value’s equivalence class under Ki.
First we show that dm is a minimiser for P .
dp(dm(v)) = dp (m0(v0), . . . ,mn(vn))
= dp (repr ([v0]K0) , . . . , repr ([vn]Kn))
Note that (repr ([vi]Ki) , vi) ∈ Ki (for i ∈ {0, . . . , n}) then
(repr ([v0]K0) , . . . , repr ([vn]Kn)) is related to v by K and hence by ker dp.
Thus dp (repr ([v0]K0) , . . . , repr ([vn]Kn)) = dp(v).
It remains to show that dm is idempotent. This follows easily from the fact
that the mi are idempotent since repr(C) ∈ C for any equivalence class of mi.
Finally, assume towards a contradiction that dm thus defined is not a best
distributed minimiser for dp.
Let Ji = range (mi). Then range (mi) =
∏
i∈{0,...,n}
Ji. Then by the assumption
dp is not best distributed-minimised for
∏
i∈{0,...,n}
Ji, ∃a ∈ {0, . . . , n} and distinct
values u, v ∈ Ja such that ∀u, v which differ only at position a, where ua =
u, va = v we have dp (u) = dp (v).
Define Ra = {(u, v), (v, u)} ∪∗ IdJa . Define R = 
i∈{0,...,n}
Ri where Ri = IdJi
for i 6= a.
Thus (u, v) ∈ R⇒ dp (u) = dp (v) and hence R ⊆ ker dp |range(dm), and hence
(*) R ⊆ K.
By construction of ma, since u 6= v, then u and v must not be related by Ka
which contradicts (*).
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